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In this paper, we study the stationary and non-stationary equilibria of a de-
terministic, pure exchange, two-period overlapping generations model with habit
persistence. We show that preferences with multiplicative habits can lead to
quite di®erent equilibrium outcomes compared to subtractive ones. The two most
commonly adopted habit speci¯cations can di®er in terms of homotheticity, gross
substitutability, and uniqueness of equilibria. We illustrate these di®erences in
terms of steady state equilibria, as well as local dynamics.
JEL Classi¯cation: E52, E63.
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11 Introduction
A recent strand of the economic literature has analyzed theoretical and empirical impli-
cations of endogenous preferences, those that depend on time, personal experience, or social
conditions. Among the di®erent forms of endogenous preferences the ones displaying habits
have received particular attention. The literature on habit persistence speci¯es preferences
either using subtractive (SH) or multiplicative habits (MH), according to the terminology
introduced by Carroll (2000).1 Although habits have helped shed some light on several eco-
nomic phenomena, not much attention has been paid to the economic consequences of these
two alternative formulations. For example, Abel (1990) and Constantinides (1990) reach
similar conclusions using the two alternative formulations in the context of risk premium.
This may seem to suggest, prima facie, that the qualitative properties of models with SH
and MH are pretty similar. However, Wendner (2003), shows that the two most commonly
used habit speci¯cations may easily lead to opposite implications regarding household sav-
ings behavior. He shows that in response to an increase in the strength of habits, young
households may increase savings in the case of SH, while they may lower savings in the case
of MH. Furthermore, Carroll (2000) points out that under plausible parameter values, SH
may give rise to a not well-de¯ned utility in stochastic environments while this is not the
case using MH.
The objective of this paper is to study the two alternative formulations adopted in the
literature and to examine their di®erences in terms of multiplicity of steady states, dynamic
indeterminacy, and local dynamics. Understanding how optimal savings decisions change
according to di®erent preference speci¯cations is crucial since intertemporal consumption
decisions are at the core of macroeconomic analysis. We explore the consequences of spec-
ifying di®erent forms of habit persistence in a pure exchange, two-period lived overlapping
generations model. Habit persistence in this setting has been previously explored. Lahiri and
Puhakka (1998) consider SH in a pure exchange overlapping generations framework and show
that increasing the strength of habits raises desired savings and might lead to endogenous
cycles. In a similar framework, Bunzel (2006) argues that both SH and MH yield dynamic
behaviors that are qualitatively very similar. In this study, we show that this ¯nding do not
always hold.
Recently, Chen and Ludvigson (2006) point out the lack of theoretical studies on the
functional form of habit persistence. Using semi-parametric and structural econometric ap-
proaches, they \reverse engineer"the habit speci¯cation that best matches the cross-sections
of asset returns on a relatively large portfolio. Their empirical ¯ndings suggest that the
habit function should be non-linear in current and past consumption rather than linear.
Hence, they seem to suggest that a MH speci¯cation is empirically preferred to a SH one. A
theoretical investigation of the underlying properties of the two habit formulations is thus
needed.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that modeling preferences with MH or
SH yields theoretical predictions that are not necessarily equivalent. We ¯nd that modeling
habit persistence with MH may not always yield concave or homothetic preferences over
consumption. This modeling choice can give rise to multiple monetary steady states, and
hence stationary sunspots equilibria may arise. In addition, the stability properties of an
1Some examples of MH are Abel (1990) and Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) and for SH, Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) and Constantinides (1990).
2economy with MH change drastically as we vary the strength of habits. Adopting the
hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) class of preferences, we ¯nd instances in which
there is a unique steady state under both speci¯cations. However, we also ¯nd cases in which
there are multiple steady states under MH while there is a unique steady state under SH.
Thus, the resulting qualitative properties of the economy under SH and that under MH can
be quite di®erent. If the choice of how to model savings behavior in the presence of habits
is not innocuous, the predictions and policy prescriptions based on the two types of habit
persistence could be quite di®erent as well.
In the next section, we introduce the general model with MH and SH and study the
corresponding concavity and homotheticity properties of these preferences. Then, we analyze
the steady state equilibria and their associated dynamics. In section 3, we provide a general
result on the di®erence in the dynamics under the Classical case. We present numerical
examples that suggest, once again, non-negligible discrepancies across MH and SH in terms
of local stability properties of the steady states. The last section summarizes our main
¯ndings and concludes. The proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Model
This paper builds on Gale (1973) and Lahiri and Puhakka (1998) by considering a pure
exchange overlapping generations model. Complex dynamics and endogenous cycles have
been shown to emerge in overlapping generation models with production and/or a variety of
di®erent assumptions concerning market imperfections.2 Here we abstract from technology
to reinforce the point we are trying to make: with habits, di®erences in dynamics and in
steady states properties need not to be driven by the production side of the economy, but
rather by the modeling choice of preferences alone. Economic activity takes place over in¯nite
discrete time. Each generation lives for two periods and has perfect foresight. Agents are
endowed with w1 units of the single good when young, and with w2 units when old.
Utility is derived from consumption in both periods. However, due to the presence of
habit formation, utility of a given level of consumption when old depends on consumption
when young.3 Formally:
V (c1;c2) = u(c1) + ¯ u(c1;c2;°) (1)
where ° 2 (0;1) denotes the strength of habits in the instantaneous utility function and ¯ is
the discount factor. We assume that the function u(:) is well-behaved, i.e. strictly increasing,
strictly concave, homogeneous, and twice continuously di®erentiable. If one considers SH,
then preferences are typically given by u(c1;c2;°) = u(c2 ¡ °c1) as in Lahiri and Puhakka
(1998).4 If, instead, the instantaneous utility is speci¯ed with MH, we have u(c1;c2;°) =
u(c2=c
°
1). Regardless of the speci¯cation considered, the importance of past consumption
in determining the utility derived by the \e®ective"consumption is increasing with °. Each
agent maximizes utility subject to budget constraints; c1 = w1 ¡ st when young, and c2 =
w2+Rtst when old. st and Rt denote savings when young and the gross nominal interest rate
on savings at time t, respectively. As pointed out by Lahiri and Puhakka (1998), we need
2See Boldrin and Woodford (1990) for a survey.
3Speci¯cally, both the absolute level of consumption in the second period and the change in consumption
between the two periods are important. The higher the consumption when young, the more consumption in
the following period is required to derive a given level of utility.
4In this case, one needs to impose also ° < c1
c2.
3to impose conditions on the parameters to ensure that the indi®erence curves are downward
sloping. These conditions for the subtractive and multiplicative case are respectively:
u0 (c1)
u0 (c2 ¡ °c1)








¢ ¡ °¯ > 0: (3)
In what follows, we ¯rst study the concavity, homothetic properties, and the steady state
equilibria that emerge in each case. We then explore the local dynamic properties of the
equilibria under each habit speci¯cation.
2.1 Preferences
One of the most important di®erences across alternative habit speci¯cations is in terms
of their implications for the underlying preferences. Alonso-Carrera, Caball¶ e, and Raurich
(2005) show that when habits are introduced multiplicatively in a capital accumulation
model, the consumers' objective function might fail to be concave. In this paper, we ¯nd a
similar result for pure exchange overlapping generation models as stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (Concavity) Consider a pure exchange two-period lived overlapping gen-
erations model. Then: (i) under SH persistence, the utility function is strictly concave in
consumption, and (ii) under MH persistence, concavity is not always ensured.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that one needs to be cautious when solving for the consumption
plan that maximizes consumers' utility under MH. The next proposition outlines another
crucial implication in terms of the savings function resulting from the consumer's problem.
The adoption of MH or SH can greatly a®ect the savings behavior, even if other fundamentals
remain the same.
Proposition 2 (Homotheticity) If the instantaneous utility function u(:) is homogeneous
of degree n, then the SH speci¯cation yields homothetic preferences whereas the MH speci¯-
cation does not.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is well known that, in overlapping generations models, the saving function is linear in
income/endowments if the lifetime utility function is homothetic (De la Croix and Michel,
2002). Thus, in general, we expect to observe substantial di®erences in the underlying
dynamics between SH and MH speci¯cations. This particular comparison is carried out in
section 3.
2.2 Steady State Equilibria
In this section, we show that if one adopts SH, then there exists a unique monetary
steady state while under MH multiple monetary equilibria cannot be ruled out. The optimal
4savings function for a young agent in this model with MH is de¯ned as follows:
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Thus, the equation that de¯nes the optimal savings can be written as:
F(s) = ¡u
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(w1 ¡ s) + (R + °)¯u
0
((R + °)s + w2 ¡ °w1) = 0: (6)
To close the model and to analyze the steady states, we introduce an outside asset into
the economy. Following Lahiri and Puhakka (1998), we assume that there is a government
that borrows from and lends to the public. This approach is clearly equivalent to injecting
valueless ¯at money into the economy. Government liabilities in period t are denoted by bt,
and the real de¯cit by dt. The government's budget constraint for period t is then given by:
dt + Rt¡1bt¡1 = bt: (7)
Asset market equilibrium requires that bt = st for all t. Setting the government's de¯cit to
zero, the law of motion for this economy is de¯ned as follows:
st+1 = stRt (8)
which also represents the o®er curve for this economy. If bt > 0, then the economy is in the
Samuelson case according to the terminology ¯rst coined by Gale (1973). Instead, if bt < 0,
then the economy is in the Classical case.
Using a general instantaneous utility function does not always yield an explicit expression
for optimal savings, nor for the gross interest elasticity of savings. Thus, it is not possible
to explicitly analyze equation (8). However, we can characterize a crucial di®erence between
SH and MH in a general setting where no explicit functional form assumptions regarding the
utility are made. The following proposition states that the standard results on uniqueness
of steady states do not necessarily apply to the case with MH. This result will then have
crucial implications for the local dynamics of the economy.
Proposition 3 (Uniqueness) Restrict the parameter space such that the consumer's prob-
lem is concave. Under SH, there always exists a unique monetary steady state. Under MH,
on the other hand, multiplicity of monetary steady states cannot be ruled out.
Proof. See Appendix.
The economic intuition behind this result is related to the possible lack of gross substi-
tutability under the MH speci¯cation. It is well known that when consumption in the ¯rst
and the second periods are weak gross substitutes, then the steady state is unique.5 This
5The ¯rst to study the gross substitutability condition in a two-period overlapping generation model is
Grandmont (1985).
5condition can be veri¯ed by studying the sign of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(IES). Under the subtractive speci¯cation, IES is always positive, whereas under the multi-
plicative case it can be negative. Formally, the IES between consumption when young and































The crucial term in ª is @2V
@c1@c2; if this is negative then gross substitutability could break




00(c2 ¡ c1) > 0:


















The sign of this expression depends on the underlying parameter values of the model.
Under intertemporally non-separable preferences, the elasticity of substitution between
current and future consumption is time variant. In particular, di®erent functional forms
for the period utility imply di®erent degrees of IES. A subtractive speci¯cation implies that
consumption in the ¯rst and the second periods are always gross substitutes, whereas this
is not necessarily true when a multiplicative formulation is adopted. Due to lack of gross
substitutability, it is not possible to rule out the existence of multiple monetary steady states
under MH. In the next section, we derive a general result on the dynamics in the Classical
case. We also present numerical examples that highlight the di®erences between MH and
SH modeling choices.
3 Dynamics
One clear message so far is that we should expect di®erences in the local dynamics
between the two speci¯cations due to homotheticity or the lack thereof. Before we proceed
any further, let us establish a general result for the Classical case which follows directly from
a theorem by Gale (1973). The following proposition together with Proposition 2 suggest
that alternative habit formulations can yield drastically di®erent results in terms of dynamic
indeterminacy in the Classical case.
Proposition 4 (Gale, 1973) In the Classical case, if the utility function is either (i) sep-
arable, or (ii) homothetic then there exist a unique path approaching the steady state given
an initial condition.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 5 by Gale (1973, p.25).
Weak gross substitutability implies that, if it exists, there is at most one equilibrium
price sequence which converges to the steady state. Proposition 4 and Lemma 1 suggest
that this is not necessarily the case for MH.
6Lemma 1 In the Classical case, SH lead to determinate dynamic equilibrium whereas MH
may display dynamic indeterminacy.
Proof. Recall that both habit speci¯cations imply non-separable preferences. In addition,
Proposition 2 proved that preferences are non-homothetic under MH while they are homo-
thetic under SH. These facts together with Proposition 4 above complete the proof.











where ² is the gross interest rate elasticity of savings. Since we can not obtain a closed form
solution for the o®er curve neither under MH nor under SH, it is not possible to study its
behavior analytically. For this reason, we provide numerical examples that illustrate how
the dynamics can di®er. In particular, we show that multiple monetary steady states are
possible under MH.
3.1 Numerical Examples
For our numerical examples, let us consider the class of preferences with hyperbolic
absolute risk aversion (HARA). This is a general class that nests, as special cases, the
family of utility functions with a constant coe±cient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), the
one with a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), and the quadratic utility. The HARA
family is commonly used in the ¯nance literature which deals with asset pricing and savings'
behavior.6 Carroll and Kimball (1996) show how CARA and CRRA speci¯cations imply a
savings behavior that is qualitatively very di®erent from the one corresponding to a HARA
formulation. In particular, they show that under HARA preferences and uncertainty, the
consumption function is concave, whereas it is linear when CARA and CRRA speci¯cations
are adopted.7 Therefore, the underlying choice of preferences is crucial.












where A and ¾ are real numbers, and ® > 0. Incorporating MH in the HARA family yields


























Typically, to characterize the dynamic properties of this economy, we need to determine the
slope of the o®er curve at each of the steady states. The marginal rate of substitution at the
6See Ingersoll (1987) for a survey of this literature.
7Carroll (2000, p.68) points out other reasons to avoid CRRA in habit formation models. He states
that: \CRRA utility in combination with the subtractive formulation...has several theoretical problems,
the gravest of which is that for microeconomically plausible parameterizations of consumption variation
the equation [of consumption] accumulation can easily lead to a zero or negative argument to the [utility]
function...generating in¯nite negative utility".
7initial endowment point should be studied as well. However, the HARA utility function may
not always be de¯ned at the origin. Formally, the utility function is de¯ned if A + ®c
¾ ¸ 0.
By substituting the budget constraint for each period into the respective °ow utilities we










(w1 ¡ st)° ¸ 0: (B2)
Therefore, we need to make sure that these additional restrictions are met when studying
the examples.
For the benchmark case, we formulate a simple economy that is in line with general
empirical observations. Throughout our numerical analysis we set ¯ = 0:55 which corre-
sponds to an annual discount rate of 0.97 when the generation considered lasts 20 years.
Since there is a lack of evidence in terms of the empirically plausible range of the parameter
measuring the strength of habits, we decided to adopt the following calibration strategy for
our benchmark example. First, we use data from Gourinchas and Parker (2002) for the life
cycle pro¯les of income and consumption. The endowment parameters of our economy are
set to mimic their income data. Based on their data, we computed the ratio of average
consumption (income) between the age 45-65 to the average consumption (income) between
the age of 26-44. This procedure yields 0.933 as the ratio of average consumption when old
to young, and 1.102 as the ratio of average income when old to young. Second, given that
there is a non-concavity issue we are forced to use (6), which are the ¯rst order conditions
under SH, for calibration purposes. We also employ (9) to calibrate the model and retrieve
the corresponding values for ° and ¾. We force the IES to be one, a value con¯rmed by most
recent studies.8 We assign the following parameter values to the utility function: A = ¡1,
and ® = 1. The resulting calibrated values are ° = 0:440 and ¾ = 0:226. Finally, using
















2 ) 1 0.958
Table 1: Benchmark example.
The tables throughout our paper provide information regarding steady state allocations
8See Guvenen (2006).
8for savings (ss:s:), consumption when young (cs:s:
1 ) and when old (cs:s
2 ), the gross interest rate
elasticity of savings (²), and the slope of the o®er curve evaluated at the steady state (1+ 1
²).
The tables also report the principal minor (PM) and the determinant of the associated
Hessian at steady state (detH) as well. We do so in light of Proposition 1 that points
out the potential lack of concavity under the MH case. Finally, we report the conditions
established in equations (2) and (3): we have downward sloping indi®erence curves and
meaningful economic equilibria when MRSC is positive. In addition, we provide the steady
state intertemporal elasticity of substitution for each example (ª(cs:s:
1 ;cs:s
2 )). Note that the
qualitative properties of the o®er curve and that of the steady states can be replicated
under many other parameterizations. Clearly, both economies are in the Classical case
where steady states savings are negative. In the benchmark case, the local dynamics of the
monetary steady states are similar: they are both stable. However, we ¯nd that by varying
slightly the strength of habits, °, the dynamic properties of the steady state can greatly di®er
as illustrated by the following examples. As we increase the strength of habits, the number
of steady state monetary equilibria and the corresponding local dynamics vary depending
on the speci¯c habit formulation adopted.
Example 1 Holding all other parameters constant, if we set ° = 0:45825 we ¯nd two mon-
etary steady states under MH and a unique monetary steady state under SH. The local
dynamics associated with these two di®erent sets of steady states are quite di®erent.
SH MH
Steady State Steady State I Steady State II
ss:s: -0.069 -0.744 0.771
cs:s:
1 1.069 1.744 0.229
cs:s
2 1.033 0.358 1.873
² -8.184 -1.330 0.007
(1 + 1
²) 0.878 0.248 142.677
PM -0.275 -0.068 -221.299
detH 0.072 0.135 15.753
MRSC 0.550 0.796 0.337
ª(cs:s:
1 ;cs:s
2 ) 0.999 0.929 0.012
Table 2: Multiplicity of equilibria under MH but not under SH.
It is interesting to note that, as we increase the strength of habits by only 4 percent rel-
ative to our benchmark example,two steady states with opposite stability properties emerge
under MH, whereas the steady state for SH remains unique and stable. Steady state I for
the MH case in example 1 is stable with converging monotone dynamics. Steady state II,
on the other hand, is unstable. Sunspot equilibria can be constructed as a lottery between
two deterministic steady states as in Cass and Shell (1983). Furthermore, since multiple
steady states exist under MH, bifurcation phenomena are possible as we vary the strength of
habits. By changing °, we can move from a situation with a unique steady state to another
where multiple steady states are possible. We may witness the economy switching from a
situation with one steady state to a situation with two steady states or vice versa. An-
other interesting observation is that MH exhibit a Classical steady state and a Samuelsonian
9steady state, suggesting that there are discontinuities in the o®er curve probably due to the
aforementioned lack of concavity.
As we can see from Table 2, multiple steady states are possible when MH are considered.
This situation is non-generic since the only way to have multiple monetary steady states is
for consumers to be indi®erent between two (or more) levels of savings when R = 1 holds.
In other words, we make sure that the maxima we obtain from the consumers' optimization
problem yield exactly the same utility level. Recall from Proposition 3 that multiple maxima
do never occur under SH.
Example 2 Holding all other parameters constant, if ° = 0:600 we have a unique monetary
















2 ) 0.977 0.773
Table 3: Unique equilibrium under SH and MH.
The ¯rst thing to notice in this example is that for the same parameterization the two
habit speci¯cations yield very di®erent predictions. As one can see from Table 3, the economy
under SH is in the Samuelsonian case whereas the economy under MH is in the Classical
case. Furthermore, under SH, we ¯nd that the monetary steady state is locally unstable
because (1+ 1
²) is greater than one and endogenous arising volatility is not possible (² > 0).
Under MH, we observe monotonic dynamics converging to the steady state. If the choice of
how to model savings behavior in the presence of habits is not innocuous, the predictions
and policy prescriptions based on the two types of habit persistence could be quite di®erent.
3.2 Endowment pro¯les or outer utility?
In a recent paper, Bunzel (2006) argues that, regardless of whether one adopts SH or MH,
the dynamical properties of the pure exchange economy are very similar. She imposes an
outer utility function that is CRRA and for tractability she considers only the case in which
the second period endowments are zero. Here we show that Bunzel's irrelevance results are
driven by the speci¯c choice of the utility function and not by the particular endowment
pro¯le considered. If one adopts the HARA utility function, then the MH speci¯cation can
indeed a®ect the qualitative properties of the dynamical system even when there is no second
period endowment.
10Example 3 Setting ° = 0:897155, w1 = 3, and w2 = 0, we ¯nd two monetary steady states
under MH and a unique monetary steady state under SH. Local dynamics associated with
these two sets of steady states are quite di®erent.
SH MH
Steady State Steady State I Steady State II
ss:s: 1.985 1.257 2.424
cs:s:
1 1.015 1.742 0.576
cs:s
2 1.985 1.257 2.424
² -0.200 -0.116 0.097
(1 + 1
²) -3.984 -7.639 11.315
PM -0.799 -0.059 -4.264
detH 0.158 0.016 0.177
MRSC 1.006 1.085 1.019
ª(cs:s:
1 ;cs:s
2 ) 0.896 1.181 0.191
Table 4: Multiplicity of equilibria under MH but not under SH.
As we can see from Table 4, not all steady states are unstable under both habit speci¯-
cations. The local dynamics around the steady state under SH display non-damped oscilla-
tions. This is also the case for the steady state I under MH but steady state II has diverging
monotonic dynamics, instead.
The point we want to convey by presenting all the previous examples is to show how
the stability properties of an economy can di®er depending on whether the speci¯cation
is SH or MH. Lahiri and Puhakka (1998) show that, under the subtractive speci¯cation,
switches between a Samuelsonian and a Classical economy are possible as the strength of
habits varies. We extend their ¯ndings to show that, as habits grow stronger, di®erences in
savings behavior across MH and SH cases are possible. The response of savings to a variation
in the gross interest rate depends crucially on the adopted speci¯cation. In general, with
SH, the marginal utility of consumption when old is decreasing in c1 at a decreasing rate.
However, this might not be the case when we use the MH speci¯cation. In the latter case,
marginal utility of e®ective consumption when old is decreasing in c1 at an increasing or
at a decreasing rate depending on parameter values. This implies that, agents might value
consumption growth more under the multiplicative speci¯cation than under the subtractive
speci¯cation.
4 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to examine the di®erences between two alternative formu-
lations used in the habit persistence literature. In particular, we explore the consequences
of adopting multiplicative versus subtractive habits in terms of multiplicity of steady states,
dynamic indeterminacy, and local dynamics. We ¯nd that in a pure exchange two-period
lived overlapping generations model, adopting MH as opposed to SH can result in very di®er-
ent outcomes. First, we show that in general under MH, the optimization problem may not
11be concave and that preferences are not homothetic. Second, we ¯nd that multiple monetary
steady states cannot be ruled out under MH. Third, we provide numerical examples that
illustrate how the local dynamic properties of the economy crucially depend on the type of
habits considered as well as their strength.
Finally, it is worth to point out that we did not fully explore the di®erences in the global
dynamics of the two alternative speci¯cations. Since discontinuities in the o®er curve are
possible under MH due to the non-concavity of preferences, dynamic equilibrium may not
exist for some initial conditions. However, the o®er curve under SH is continuous. Our
educated guess, therefore, is that SH and MH could yield very di®erent time series patterns.
This suggests that the results on the irrelevance of modeling habits by Bunzel (2006) may
not hold under a more general speci¯cation of preferences even at the global level. We leave
this for future research.
Our ¯ndings indicate that there are important di®erences on how savings behave across
the two most commonly adopted habit speci¯cations. The choice of how to model savings
behavior in the presence of habits is not as innocuous as it might seem. Hence, the predictions
and policy prescriptions based on the two types of habit persistence modeling choices could
be quite di®erent.
12Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (i) The principal minor of the Hessian associated with the SH speci¯cation is given
by u00(c1) + °2¯u00(c2 ¡ °c1). Note that this expression is always negative. The determinant
is given by ¯u00(c1)u00(c2 ¡ °c1) which is always positive. Therefore, the Hessian is negative
de¯nite and concavity is ensured.
(ii) Repeating the process for the case of MH, we ¯nd that the ¯rst principal minor is negative
if and only if:
u










































































Therefore, the Hessian is negative semi-de¯nite only under certain parameter restrictions.
To check that these conditions could be violated in some cases, we need to provide at least
one explicit example where the objective is not concave. Consider the HARA instantaneous






















w1 = 3, w2 = 1, ° = 0:75, ¾ = 0:39, A = ¡1, ® = 0:79, and ¯ = 0:55. Then for
st 2 [0:974;2:289], concavity is violated.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. It it su±cient to show that the von NeumannMorgenstern utility function in the
subtractive case is homogeneous of degree n, while the one in the multiplicative case is not.
Let ¸ > 0 be a scalar. If we multiply the ¯rst and second period consumption by ¸ in the
subtractive case we obtain: u(¸c1) + ¯u(¸c2 ¡ °¸c1) = u(¸c1) + ¯u(¸(c2 ¡ °c1)). Assuming
that the felicity function u(:) is homogeneous of degree n, then the overall utility function is
clearly homothetic, i.e. ¸nu(c1) + ¸n¯u(c2 ¡ °c1) = ¸nV (c1;c2).
For the multiplicative case, instead, we show that the utility function is not homogeneous



















n(1¡°)¯u(c2 ¡ °c1) 6= ¸
nV (c1;c2)
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The implicit function that de¯nes the optimal level of savings, ^ s, under SH is given
by:
13¯(R + °)u
0((R + °)s + w2 ¡ °w1) = u
0(w1 ¡ s)
Since both the left and the right hand side of the ¯rst order condition (FOC) are continuous





00(w1 ¡ s) > 0
@¯(R + °)u0((R + °)s + w2 ¡ °w1)
@s
= ¯(R + °)
2u
00((R + °)s + w2 ¡ °w1) < 0
Note that the second expression (derivative of the left hand side of the FOC) is strictly
decreasing in s and the ¯rst expression (derivative of the right hand side of the FOC) is
strictly increasing in s. By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique level of
optimal savings, ^ s. However, the same conclusion cannot be drawn under MH. The implicit












While the right hand side is strictly increasing in s, the sign of the slope for the left hand















































R(w1 ¡ s) + °(Rs + w2)(w1 ¡ s)°¡1
(3° + 1)(w1¡s)2°¡1
Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibilities for multiple or a continuum of equilibrium
values of s¤. Note that we cannot rule out the possibility of no equilibria either.
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